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Abstract—Consider a group of effort-averse, or lazy, sensors
that seek to minimize the effort invested to collect measurements
of a variable. Increasing the effort invested by the sensors
improves the quality of the measurements provided to the central
planner but this incurs increased costs to the sensors. The central
planner, which processes the sensor measurements, employs an
averaging estimator. It also determines contracts for rewarding
sensors based on the measurements obtained. The problem of
designing a contract that yields an estimation-error based quality-
of-service level in return for the reward extended to sensors is
investigated in this paper. To this end, a game is formulated
between the central planner and the sensors. Conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium are identified.
The equilibrium is constructed explicitly and its properties in
response to a reward based contract are studied. It turns out
that the central planner, while not being able to directly measure
the effort invested by the sensors, can enhance the estimation
quality by rewarding each sensor based on the distance of
its measurements from the output of the averaging estimator.
Ultimately, optimal contracts are designed from the perspective
of the budget required for achieving a specified level of estimation
error.
Index Terms—Contract Design; Effort-Averse Sensors; Game
Theory; Equilibrium; Budget Constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of networked platforms, from smart phones to
wearable gadgets, has increased at a staggering rate in the last
few years. Capitalizing on the ubiquity of networked devices
in various circumstances gives rise to issues that relate to the
ownership of and authority over such devices. For example,
crowd-sensing applications involve registered participants (or
agents) providing measurements of a quantity, such as the
traffic congestion in a locale or the quality of a service
received from a provider, which are then combined to construct
accurate estimates of this variable. This, however, opens doors
to selfish behaviours when collecting the measurements due
to resource constraints, privacy concerns, conflicts of interest,
or security issues. Many studies have speculated on the use
of monetary rewards to provide appropriate incentives to the
participants, e.g., [1]. However, there are several concerns
that need to be addressed before adopting such schemes. For
instance, if the rewards are not tied to the quality of the
The work was supported by a McKenzie Fellowship and the Australian
Research Council (LP130100605).
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Electronic En-
gineering, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia.
Emails:{ffarokhi,ishames,cantoni}@unimelb.edu.au
provided measurements, effort-averse1 (or lazy) agents do not
have any incentive for providing high-quality measurements
in view of the requisite high investment of effort (e.g. time,
energy, loss of opportunity) to collect such measurements.
Moreover, providing rewards that promote the sensors towards
the investment of more effort is not straightforward since the
quality of measurements, or equivalently the effort that is
invested by the sensors, may not be fixed or known ahead
of time.
Consider a group of effort-averse sensors that provide
measurements of a variable of interest to a central planner.
The central planner implements a simple averaging estima-
tor and rewards the sensors to improve the quality of the
collected measurements (equivalently to increases the amount
invested efforts by the sensors) according to a contract that
is fixed before any measurements are taken. Consideration
of the simple averaging estimator is motivated by the central
planner’s lack of direct control over and general ignorance of
the effort that individual sensors invest, whereby optimality
of averaging weights cannot be reasonably defined (as in
the case of the least mean square estimator). It also greatly
simplifies the mathematical derivations and makes the scheme
robust, as discussed below. Rewards are assigned according
to contracts that entitle sensors to payments of a specific
from for measurements. This paper investigates the problem of
designing such contracts under budget constraints. In response
to the contracts, sensors determine the level of effort to invest
in order to strike a balance between the corresponding cost and
the expected reward to be gained. The described interaction
between the sensors and the central planner is modelled by
a game. Conditions are provided to guarantee the existence
and uniqueness of an equilibrium of the corresponding game.
The equilibrium is constructed explicitly and its properties are
investigated as a function of the parameters of the proposed
contracts. Interestingly, the efforts invested by the sensors, at
the captured equilibrium, are dominant strategies. That is, even
if some sensors are faulty or mistakenly setting their efforts,
it is in the best interest of each effort-averse sensor to expend
the equilibrium effort. This property makes the presented
framework robust to faults and cyber-security threats (as, in
1The term effort averse is borrowed from the economics literature. For
instance, in insurance industry, it is observed that “flat wage leaves the agents
with no incentive to avoid behaviours ... that increase the risks” since such
avoidance requires investing effort (which is clearly not rewarded under flat
wages) [2, p. 352]. Therefore, several studies have been devoted to designing
optimal contracts that reward efforts either directly (based on the time and
energy spent) or indirectly (based on the outcome) [2], [3].
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2these cases, some sensors might not follow the strategies that
are in their best interests). Finally, two fundamental properties
for averaging estimators are proved. The first property provides
the minimum required budget for achieving a specified level
of the estimation error, while the second one bounds the
quality of the estimates for a given budget. These fundamental
properties are proved over the set of all individually rational
contracts for which the ex ante expected return of each sensor
is non-negative (as, otherwise, the sensors opt out of the
sensing scheme). These fundamental properties are used to
design optimal contracts under budget constraints. To provide
the context for the novelty of these results, related literature
on incentivizing sensors in participatory-sensing schemes is
reviewed below. A brief description of the paper structure
follows.
The problem of incentivizing strategic participants in crowd-
sensing problems has been studied extensively in the past;
see [4] for a review of the results. In [5], the sensors are as-
sumed to sell homogeneous (interchangeable) sensing data to a
central planner with a minimal required level of participation.
The sensors submit bids and the ones with the lowest bids are
recruited and compensated. Since sensors may lose interest
in future participation if they consistently lose in the bidding
process, the sensors that are not recruited in a given round are
incentivized by using a virtual currency that is payable, in the
future, on reduction of their submitted bids. The framework is
extended in [6] to accommodate budget constraints. A crowd-
sensing scheme for buying and selling parking information is
introduced in [7], where the rewards are designed to bring
good information and deter malicious behaviour by rational
individuals (e.g., adding fake data for personal gain). In [8],
gathering data when the sensors incur a constant cost for their
reports is considered. The central planner is assumed to need
more than a certain number of participants to obtain a positive
revenue for itself. At the beginning of the process, the central
planner announces the total reward (to be divided between the
sensors) and the minimum number of sensors required. The
sensors then decide to participate if the reward divided by the
number of participants in that round (if the threshold is passed)
is larger than their costs. Mobile sensors moving in and out of
desired sensing area are considered in [9]. At the beginning
of each time slot, a subset of the sensors are assigned to a
task. The sensing range is assumed to be limited and sensing
is considered to be costly. It is also assumed that sensors
suffer indirect costs when not performing any tasks. Therefore,
sensors may drop out if they are not rewarded enough in the
long run. The central planner aims at maximizing its return
while making sure there are not many drop outs. The central
planner in [10] is assumed to seek sensors for completing tasks
inside a region of interest. The sensors have different arrival
and departure times as well as privately-known costs for each
task. They bid for a group of tasks and the planner selects a
group of them to perform the tasks under a budget constraint.
A common feature of the schemes described above is the
aim of retaining a useful set of participants while minimising
expenditure of the central planner. By contrast, the work
presented here focuses on influencing the underlying effort
invested by the participanting sensors in order to improve the
quality of estimates determined by averaging.
This paper is closer, in essence, to the studies in [9]–
[14]. In [11], the sensors are assumed to incur a cost that is
proportional to the time they dedicate to a sensing task. The
central planner then rewards the participants by an amount that
they divide among themselves according to the time spent by
each to provide measurements. The objective of the central
planner is to maximize a measure of the time invested by the
sensors. In [12], the central planner wants to assign a set of
tasks with different valuations among sensors under a total
budget constraint. Each sensor can only perform one task at
a time (but it can move between multiple tasks) and has a
sensing cost per unit of time, which is not available to the
central planner. The sensors also have privately-known ranges
of time during which they can perform the sensing tasks.
The sensors first bid prices (costs to the central planner) for
their service, start times, and end times. Then, the planner
announces a plan (time period allocated to tasks for each
sensor) and compensate them accordingly. The goal is to
maximize the total time that the sensors dedicate to the tasks.
In [13], the sensors are assumed to have privately-known types
(such as the marginal cost of participation or a measure of
their skills) and invest efforts for gathering information. The
cost of sensing is assumed to depend on the type and the
effort in a specific form. The central planner only compensates
the sensor that invests the highest effort (proportional to its
invested effort) and the sensors maximize the expected reward
minus the cost. The goal of the central planner is to maximize
the total invested effort minus the reward. In [14], sensors
are considered to have different participation levels (e.g., the
number of transmitted measurements per unit of time) set by
the central planner, which would, in a linear manner, affect
their costs (with the coefficients being only known by them).
The quality of the service is a function of the participation
levels and the quality of the provided measurements. The
central planner relies on the past experiences to empirically
track the quality of the measurements provided by each sensor.
The sensors report costs and, based on that, the central
planner fixes their participation levels and provides payments.
The aforementioned schemes differ in several ways from the
framework formulated in this paper. Perhaps most importantly,
in the framework developed below the central planner does
not measure, estimate or directly set the effort expended by
the sensors in providing measurements. Rather the central
planner seeks to influence the effort invested in the presence
of a contract that governs sensor reward. Furthermore, more
general cost functions are accommodated and optimality with
respect to budget constraints is explored more explicitly.
The framework of this paper also relates to the problem
of designing appropriate incentives for agents to truthfully
communicate their preferences, most often the parameters of
their cost functions, which has a long history in the economics
literature on mechanism design; see, e.g., [15], [16]. In those
studies, the central planner wishes to make a social decision
after discerning from the agents their fixed and privately-
held preferences. This differs from the problem considered
here in that the central planner does not seek to recover
the private information associated with the effort expended
3by each sensor, which is not fixed and merely serves as
an indicator of measurement quality. In fact, the efforts are
functions of the contracts provided by the central planner to
elicit higher quality estimates.
In what follows, the outline of the paper is presented. In Sec-
tion II, the underlying problem is formulated in game-theoretic
terms. Contracts are constructed in Section III. Finally, a
numerical example is given in Section IV and concluding
remarks are presented in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the case where a central planner wishes to obtain
an accurate measurement of a variable2 x ∈ R by obtaining
measurements from n sensors. The sensors need to expend
an effort denoted by ai ∈ R≥0 to measure the variable x.
The effort is unknown to the central planner. It determines
the quality of the corresponding sensor measurement, which
is given by
yi = x+ wi,
where wi is a zero-mean random variable with the variance
E{w2i } = ηi(ai) and ηi : R≥0 → R≥0 is an appropriate
mapping that captures the return on the effort expended by
the sensor.
Assumption 1: E{wiwj} = 0 if i 6= j.
Remark 1: Note that Assumption 1 is satisfied so long as the
sensors do not have access to each other’s measurements and
the estimate constructed by the central planner when reporting
their measurements. This is satisfied, in the setup of this paper,
as the sensors are not allowed to renegotiate their contract with
the central planner and update their measurements after the
estimate constructed by the central planner is revealed.
Assumption 2: The mapping ηi : R≥0 → R≥0 is twice
continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing.
The pay-off to sensor i, for the measurement that it provides
to the central planner, is modelled as
Ci(ai, a−i) = αipi − fi(ai),
where pi ∈ R≥0 is a potentially stochastic unit of compensa-
tion offered by the central planner to sensor i depending on
all reported measurements, fi : R≥0 → R is a mapping that
determines the cost to sensor i for investing an effort equal
to ai, and αi ∈ R≥0 is the value-of-compensation3 from the
perspective of sensor i. Also note the game-theoretic notation
a−i = (aj)j 6=i. It is assumed that the sensors deal with the
expected cost, that is, they wish to optimize
C¯i(ai, a−i) = E{Ci(ai, a−i)}
= E{αipi − fi(ai)}
= αiE{pi} − fi(ai).
Throughout the paper, rewards take the form pi =
pii(y1, . . . , yn) for a given contract pi : Rn → Rn. The term
2The scalar nature of the variable of interest is without the loss of generality
as entries of a vector can individually be treated in a similar manner.
3This can be determined by surveying the sensors or utilizing historical
data. Alternatively, the parameter can be eliminated by replacing it with the
average value for the society; however, this results in an approximate analysis.
contract is used because, while the compensation mapping
pi : Rn → Rn is agreed prior to expending the effort and
gathering data, the level of compensation pi is determined
after the sensors report their measurements. That is, when
the sensors agree to participate in this process, they are
given a contract for their reports in the future. Moreover, the
assumption of dealing with the expectation of the cost is only
useful/valid if the sensors provide several reports so that their
average returns are well-modelled with the expectation of their
cost functions.
Assumption 3: The mapping fi : R≥0 → R is twice
continuously differentiable and strictly increasing.
Definition 1 (Contract Game): A contract game with com-
pensation contract pi : Rn → Rn is defined as a tuple
(n, (R≥0)ni=1, (C¯i)ni=1) that encodes n effort-averse sensors
each with the action space R≥0 and utility C¯i(ai, a−i) =
αiE{pii(y1, . . . , yn)} − fi(ai). The parameters of the game
include (αi)ni=1 as well as the parameters of mappings pi,
(fi)
n
i=1, and (ηi)
n
i=1.
Definition 2 (Contract Equilibrium): An action tuple
(a∗i )
n
i=1 ∈ Rn≥0 constitutes an equilibrium of the contract game
if a∗i ∈ arg maxai∈R≥0 C¯i(ai, a∗−i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The central planner employs a simple averaging estimator
to extract
xˆ =
1
n
(y1 + · · ·+ yn). (1)
Note that the central planner cannot implement the least mean
square estimator since it cannot directly measure nor set
the effort to be invested by the sensors. Asking sensors to
communicate the effort that they invest provides scope for
malicious behaviors or self-serving decisions, which would
ultimately increase the complexity of the central planners. The
quality of the estimate is given by
E{(x− xˆ)2} = E
{(
x− 1
n
(y1 + · · ·+ yn)
)2}
= E
{(
1
n
(w1 + · · ·+ wn)
)2}
=
1
n2
n∑
i=1
ηi(ai).
Throughout this paper, it is assumed that the amount of effort
ai expended by sensor i is only known to itself and that this
is, implicitly, a function of the devised compensation contract.
Clearly, having a fixed compensation policy such that pi = c
for all ai ∈ R≥0 and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is not good. This
is because, in that case, C¯i(ai, a−i) = αic − fi(ai) for all
ai ∈ R≥0. Now, by Assumption 3, it can be seen that it is
in the best interest of the sensor to select ai = 0. This is
not the preferable outcome for the central planner in terms of
the estimate quality. To fix this issue, it important that E{pi}
becomes a function of ai. This is the topic of the next section.
III. COMPENSATION BASED ON EMPIRICAL STATISTICS
Consider the compensation policy
pi = pii(y1, . . . , yn)
= δi − γi(xˆ− yi)2, (2)
4where γi, δi ∈ R≥0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are appropriately-selected
constants. At first sight, the compensation policy in (2) might
seem restrictive, or arbitrary. However, at the end of this
section, is it established that this policy requires the least total
budget for achieving a specified level of performance. Further,
for a given budget, it achieves the smallest estimation error
variance. For this compensation contract, by Assumption 1,
E{pi} = E{δi − γi(xˆ− yi)2}
= δi − γiE
{(
1
n
(y1 + · · ·+ yn)− yi
)2}
= δi − γiE
{(
− n− 1
n
wi +
1
n
∑
j 6=i
wj
)2}
= δi − γi
((
n− 1
n
)2
ηi(ai) +
1
n2
∑
j 6=i
ηj(aj)
)
.
Consequently
C¯i(ai, a−i) = αiδi −
[
αiγi
((
n− 1
n
)2
ηi(ai)
+
1
n2
∑
j 6=i
ηj(aj)
)
+ fi(ai)
]
. (3)
It is is now possible to prove the following intermediate result.
Proposition 1: Let
Ai = arg min
ai∈R≥0
[
αiγi
(
n− 1
n
)2
ηi(ai) + fi(ai)
]
. (4)
Any action tuple (a∗i )
n
i=1 ∈ Rn≥0 is a contract equilibrium if
and only if (a∗i )
n
i=1 ∈
∏n
i=1Ai.
Proof: In view of Definition 2, the proof follows imme-
diately by maximizing (3).
Definition 3 (Symmetric Contract Game): The contract game
is symmetric if αi = α, γi = γ, δi = δ, fi = f , and ηi = η
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 4 (Symmetric Contract Equilibrium): A contract
equilibrium (a∗i )
n
i=1 is symmetric if a
∗
i = a
∗
j for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . , n}.
Corollary 1: Any equilibrium of a symmetric contract game
is symmetric.
Proof: The proof follows directly from the definition of
set Ai in (4) for the case of symmetric contract games.
Remark 2 (Equilibrium vs. Dominant Strategy): Note that,
from the structure of the expected cost function in (3), the best
action of sensor i is independent of the actions of the other
sensors. Therefore, a∗i ∈ Ai is a dominant strategy for the
sensor, which is stronger than an equilibrium where the sensors
do not deviate given that the others do not deviate as well. This
means, even if some sensors are faulty or mistakenly determine
their effort, it is in the best interest of each sensor to expend
the effort a∗i ∈ Ai. This behaviour makes the estimator robust
to individual corruptions. Note that this observation however
does not exclude the possibility of the sensors being able to
improve their compensation by colluding with each other.
Proposition 2: A contract equilibrium exists if
limai→∞ fi(ai) =∞.
Proof: To prove this result, it is established that Ai 6= ∅
for all i. Let ξi : R≥0 → R be such that
ξi(ai) =
[
αiγi
(
n− 1
n
)2
ηi(ai) + fi(ai)
]
, ∀ai ∈ R≥0. (5)
It follows that limai→∞ ξi(ai) ≥ limai→∞ fi(ai) = +∞,
where the inequality follows, by definition, from the property
ηi(ai) ≥ 0 for all ai ∈ R≥0. As a result, for all Ξ ∈ R≥0,
there exists A(Ξ) ∈ R≥0 such that ξi(ai) ≥ Ξ for all
ai ≥ A(Ξ). Let Ξ′ ∈ R≥0 be an arbitrary real number such
that Ξ′ > ξi(0) = αiγi((n−1)2/n2)ηi(0)+fi(0). Now, define
the set Ω := {ai ∈ R≥0 | ai ≤ A(Ξ′)}. Clearly, the minimizer
of ξi(·) belongs to Ω because ξi(ai) > Ξ′ > ξi(0) for all
ai ∈ R≥0 \ Ω. Hence, Ai = arg minai∈Ω ξi(ai). Noting the
continuous function ξi(·) attains its minimum over the compact
set Ω, it follows that Ai is non-empty.
Throughout this report, let f ′i : R≥0 → R≥0 and f ′′i :
R≥0 → R denote the first and the second derivatives of
fi(·), respectively; these exists by Assumption 3. Similarly,
η′i : R≥0 → R≤0 and η′′i : R≥0 → R denote the first and
the second derivatives of ηi(·), respectively, which exists by
Assumption 2. For some cases, the construction of Ai can be
simplified. The next corollary presents one such case.
Corollary 2: Let αiγi[(n − 1)2/n2]η′i(0) + f ′i(0) < 0 and
αiγi[(n− 1)2/n2]η′′i (a) + f ′′i (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ R≥0. Define
Ai =
{
ai ∈ R≥0 |αiγi
(
n− 1
n
)2
η′i(ai) + f
′
i(ai) = 0
}
.
Any action tuple (a∗i )
n
i=1 ∈ Rn≥0 is a contract equilibrium if
and only if (a∗i )
n
i=1 ∈
∏n
i=1Ai.
Proof: For ξi(·), defined in (5), d2ξi(ai)/da2i ≥ 0.
Therefore, ξi(·) is a convex function. Furthermore,
d
dai
ξi(ai)
∣∣∣∣
ai=0
= αiγi
(
n− 1
n
)2
η′i(0) + f
′
i(0) < 0.
This shows that ai = 0 cannot be a minimizer of ξi(·).
Therefore, the optimizer belongs to the interior of the set R≥0
and, as a result, it should satisfy
d
dai
[
αiγi
(
n− 1
n
)2
ηi(ai) + fi(ai)
]
= 0.
This concludes the proof.
Proposition 3: The contract equilibrium is unique if
lima→∞ f(a) =∞ and αiγi[(n− 1)2/n2]η′′i (a) + f ′′i (a) > 0
for all a ∈ R≥0.
Proof: First, note that lima→∞ f(a) = +∞ guarantees
the existence of the contract equilibrium according to Propo-
sition 2. Define the set Ω and the mapping ξi : R≥0 → R
as in the proof of Proposition 2. Note that d2ξi(ai)/da2i > 0
and, therefore, ξi(·) is a strictly convex function. Therefore,
the minimizer of ξi(·) over the convex set Ω is unique.
Assume that the conditions of Corollary 2 and Proposition 3
hold. Define the mapping a∗i : R≥0 → R≥0 to be such that
αiγi
(
n− 1
n
)2
η′i(a
∗
i (γi)) + f
′
i(a
∗
i (γi)) = 0. (6)
5Following the results of Corollary 2 and Proposition 3, the
action tuple (a∗i (γi))
n
i=1 is well-defined and is a contract
equilibrium for given reward policy parameters (γi)ni=1.
Proposition 4: Under the assumptions of Corollary 2 and
Proposition 3, a∗i (γi) is an increasing function of γi.
Proof: First, note that the mapping a∗i (·) is differentiable;
see Theorem 4 in [17, p. 139]. Taking the derivative of (6) with
respect to γi yields
0 =
d
dγi
[
αiγi
(
n− 1
n
)2
η′i(a
∗
i (γi)) + f
′
i(a
∗
i (γi))
]
=αi
(
n− 1
n
)2
η′i(a
∗
i (γi))
+
[
αiγi
(
n− 1
n
)2
η′′(a∗i (γi)) + f
′′(a∗i (γi))
]
da∗i (γi)
dγi
.
Consequently
da∗i (γi)
dγi
=
−αi[(n− 1)2/n2]η′i(a∗i (γi))
αiγi[(n− 1)2/n2]η′′i (a∗i (γi)) + f ′′i (a∗i (γi))
> 0,
which follows from Assumption 2 and the inequality αiγi[(n−
1)2/n2]η′′i (a) + f
′′
i (a) > 0.
Definition 5: A compensation policy is ex ante individually
rational if C¯i(ai, a−i) ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for any contract
equilibrium (ai)ni=1 ∈
∏n
i=1Ai.
Note that, in a liberal society, individually rational com-
pensation policies must be used as, within such a society,
the sensors are free to leave the sensing scheme in the next
round of contract negotiations or to not participate in the
current round of negotiations if there is no hope of receiving
compensation in return for efforts.
Proposition 5: The proposed compensation contract in (2)
is ex ante individually rational if
δi ≥ γi
((
n− 1
n
)2
ηi(a
∗
i ) +
1
n2
∑
j 6=i
ηj(a
∗
j )
)
+
1
αi
f(a∗i )
for all (a∗i )
n
i=1 ∈
∏n
i=1Ai.
Proof: Note that
C¯i(a
∗, a∗−i) = αiδi −
[
αiγi
((
n− 1
n
)2
ηi(a
∗
i )
+
1
n2
∑
j 6=i
ηj(a
∗
j )
)
+ fi(a
∗
i )
]
= α
[
δi − γi
((
n− 1
n
)2
ηi(a
∗
i )
+
1
n2
∑
j 6=i
ηj(a
∗
j )
)
− 1
αi
f(a∗i )
]
.
Requiring C¯i(a∗, a∗−i) ≥ 0 gives the condition in the statement
of the proposition.
The condition in Proposition 5 can be greatly simplified for
symmetric contract games.
Corollary 3: The proposed compensation contract in (2) is
ex ante individually rational for a symmetric contract game if
δ ≥ γ(n− 1)η(a∗i )/n+ f(a∗i )/α, ∀a∗i ∈ Ai.
Proof: Following Corollary 1, it is known that the contract
equilibrium is symmetric, that is, a∗1 = · · · = a∗n = a∗.
Therefore,
C¯i(a
∗, a∗−i) = α
[
δ −
(
γ
(
n− 1
n
)
η(a∗) +
1
α
f(a∗)
)]
≥ 0.
This concludes the proof.
Under the conditions of Corollary 2 and Proposition 3,
the total expected budget needed for implementing (2) at the
contract equilibrium (a∗i )
n
i=1 when its parameters are set to be
individual-rationality is given by
B :=
n∑
i=1
E{pi}
=
n∑
i=1
[
δi − γi
((
n− 1
n
)2
ηi(a
∗
i )+
1
n2
∑
j 6=i
ηi(a
∗
j )
)]
(7)
≥
n∑
i=1
f(a∗i )/αi, (8)
where the inequality in (8) follows from the condition of
Proposition 5. This can be generalized to consideration of all
ex ante individually rational compensation contracts.
Proposition 6: Let pi : Rn → Rn≥0 to be an ex ante
individually rational compensation contract. Then, the budget
for implementing the contract equilibrium (a∗i )
n
i=1 is lower
bounded as B ≥∑ni=1 fi(a∗i )/αi.
Proof: Individual rationality ensures that C¯i(a∗i , a
∗
−i) ≥ 0
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This implies that αiE{pi}−fi(a∗i ) ≥ 0
and thus, B =
∑n
i=1 E{pi}≥
∑n
i=1 fi(a
∗
i )/αi.
As expected, there is a trade-off between the amount of
the budget spent and the quality of the estimate if ex ante
individually-rational compensation contracts are considered.
From this point forward, symmetric contract games are con-
sidered.
Proposition 7 (Fundamental Budget Requirement): For any
symmetric contract game, the budget for implementing any
ex ante individually rational compensation contract with es-
timation quality E{‖x − xˆ‖22} ≤  is lower bounded as
B ≥ nf(η−1())/α.
Proof: By the assumed symmetry and Corollary 1, it
follows that a∗1 = · · · = a∗n = a∗. Notice that
E{‖x− xˆ‖22} =
1
n
n∑
i=1
η(a∗i ) = η(a
∗).
Based on Assumption 2, it is known that η−1(·) exists. Hence,
if a∗ ≥ η−1() at the contract equilibrium, then the required
level of precision is achieved. Following Proposition 6, the
budget for implementing this contract equilibrium is lower
bounded by
B ≥
∞∑
i=1
f(a∗i )/αi =
n
α
f(a∗) ≥ n
α
f(η−1()).
This completes the proof.
Corollary 4 (Fundamental Performance Limit): For any
symmetric contract game, the estimation quality of any ex ante
individually rational compensation contract with the budget
6constraint B ≤ β is lower bounded as E{‖x − xˆ‖22} ≥
η(f−1(βα/n)).
Note that E{‖x− xˆ‖22} ≥ η(f−1(βα/n)) is very similar to
the Crame´r-Rao bound for Gaussian estimation problems [18].
This is because of the linear nature of the estimator in (1).
Finally, it is shown that the lower bound in Proposition 7 is
tight and is achieved by the a simple contract of the form (2).
Proposition 8: For any symmetric contract game such that
lima→∞ f(a) =∞ and η′′(a)f ′(η−1())−f ′′(a)η′(η−1()) >
0 for all a ∈ R≥0, the budget-optimal compensation contract,
among the set of all ex ante individually-rational compensation
contracts guaranteeing a performance level E{‖x− xˆ‖22} ≤ ,
is
pi(y1, . . . , yn) =
[
γ
n− 1
n
+
1
α
f(η−1())
]
− γ
(
− yi + 1
n
n∑
j=1
yj
)2
,
with γ = −(n/(n− 1))2f ′(η−1())/(αη′(η−1())).
Proof: First, notice that
αγ
(
n− 1
n
)2
η′(η−1()) + f ′(η−1()) = 0,
which means that (η−1())ni=1 is a contract equilibrium. Sub-
stituting δ = γ(n − 1)/n + f(η−1())/α and a∗i = η−1(),
∀i, in (7) gives
B =
[
γ
n− 1
n
+
1
α
f(η−1())
]
n− γ n− 1
n
n∑
i=1
η(η−1())
=
n
α
f(η−1()),
which is the smallest admissible budget according to Proposi-
tion 7.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider a scenario in which sensors are asked to take the
measurement of a variable, e.g., the travel time on a road. Not-
ing that their measurements are noisy the sensors may wish to
take multiple samples, calculate the average, and transmit that
average to the central planner. However, doing this requires the
investment of more time to provide the measurement. Let the
effort a for each sensor be proportional to the amount of the
time spent refining their measurement. Assume that the cost
of that effort is given by fi(a) = exp(ϑa). This is because,
by spending more time, the sensor loses other opportunities
for earning money while their estimate does not improve so
much as to result in a far superior return from the central
planner. Also, let ηi(a) = %/(%+a) for a constant % > 0. This
captures the following features: the more time invested, the
more samples are gathered and, hence, the more the error in the
measurement can be reduced (which is inversely proportional
to the number of the internal samples). Consider a symmetric
contract game. Clearly, if ϑ−αγ[(n−1)2/n2]/% < 0, it follows
that αγ[(n− 1)2/n2]η′i(0) + f ′i(0) < 0. Furthermore,
αγ[(n− 1)2/n2]η′′i (a) + f ′′i (a)
= 2αγ[(n− 1)2/n2]%/(%+ a)3 + ϑ2 exp(ϑa)
> 0, ∀a ∈ R≥0.
γ
100 101 102
a
∗ i
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
n = 2
n = 4
n = 8
n = 16
(a)
γ
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
E
{(
x
−
xˆ
)2
}
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n = 2
n = 4
n = 8
n = 16
(b)
γ
100 101 102
B
100
101
102
103
n = 2
n = 4
n = 8
n = 16
(c)
Fig. 1: The effort (a), the performance (b), and the budget (c)
at the contract equilibrium for the numerical example as a
function of γ for various n.
Let the compensation policy pii(y1, . . . , yn) = δ− γ(xˆ− yi)2.
Upon satisfying ϑ − αγ[(n − 1)2/n2]/% < 0, by Corollary 2
and Proposition 3, the unique contract equilibrium (a∗i )
n
i=1
satisfies −αγ((n− 1)/n)2%/(%+ a∗i )2 +ϑ exp(ϑa∗i ) = 0. Let
us consider the case where α = 1. Further, select ϑ = 1
and % = 1. For this contract equilibrium to be individually
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Fig. 2: The performance drawn as a function of the budget
for various n at the contract equilibrium for the numerical
example.
rational, according to Proposition 5, it is sufficient to set δ =
γ(n− 1)η(a∗i )/n+ f(a∗i ).
Figure 1 illustrates the effort expended by the sensors (a),
the performance of the estimator (b), and the budget required
for implementing the contract equilibrium (c) as a function
of γ for various numbers of participants n. Evidently, the
return for adding one extra sensor diminishes with increasing
n. Figure 2 shows the required budget versus the quality of
the estimate. As expected, with increasing the budget, more
accurate measurements are acquired. An interesting observa-
tion is that, for a fixed estimation quality, it is better to employ
more sensors.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The behaviour of effort-averse sensors in response to long
term compensations is studied from the perspective of obtain-
ing high-quality measurements. The interaction between the
central planner employing an averaging based estimator and
sensors via a contract is studied using a game. Conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium are identified.
Using the characterization of the contract equilibrium, optimal
contracts, in terms of the budget, are constructed for achieving
a specified level of estimation quality.
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